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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Johnny and Lynn Urrutia were husband and wife, during their marriage they formed
Sundance Arena LLC, along with Scott and Lori Jackson and deeded the subject horse arena
property to the LLC. (R. Vol. I, p. 175; R. Vol. I, p. 225; R. Vol. III, p. 317.) Later the Jackson's
withdrew from Sundance Arena LLC and still later Johnny and Lynn divorced. Their divorce
decree was silent as to Sundance Arena LLC but did award the subject arena property to Johnny.
The decree also provided that Johnny would pay Lynn certain sums of money which he
apparently did not pay. (R. VoL I, pp. 31, 33 - 38,40; R. Vol. I, pp. 124, 126 - 130, 132; R.
Aug., pp. 284,286,290, 292.)
In 2005 Ty Harrison entered into an oral contract with Johnny Urrutia to fix, repair and
improve the arena property ("Arena") so it could then be sold, at that time Johnny Urrutia was a
licensed real estate agent. (R. Aug., p. 358.) Ty Harrison and Robert Schutte were longtime
friends and as Robert Schutte lived adjacent to the arena Ty Harrison asked Robert to help with
the work on the arena. (R. Aug., p. 162.)
Schutte and Harrison spent considerable time and effort cleaning up, repairing, expanding
and later running the subject arena. (R. Aug., pp. 154, 169, 181, 183.)
Schutte and Harrison learned that Lynn Urrutia was going to file to foreclose on the arena
property, so Schutte and Harrison filed a Claim of Lien to protect their labor and materials on
December 1,2011. (R. Vol. I, p. 59.)
On February 14, 2012, Lynn Urrutia files her Complaint. (R. VoL I, pp. 14 - 49; R. Vol.
I, pp. 107-122.)
On May 16,2012 Schutte and Harrison file a second or amended Claim of Lien. (R. Vol.
I, pp. 74-78; R. Vol. I, pp. 86 - 90; R. Vol. I, pp. 164 -168; R. Aug., pp. 327, 331.)
1

On August 21, 2012 Plaintiff files for Partial Summary Judgment seeking to get Schutte
and Harrison's first Claim of Lien dismissed. (R. Aug. Vol., pp. 4, 6.)
October 15,2012, Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at which
Plaintiff is successful in getting Schutte and Harrison's first Claim of Lien dismissed, completely
ignoring the second or amended claim oflien. (Tr. Oct. 15,2012, Vasquez, pp. 3 -71.)

09/23/02

Chronology
Quitclaim Deed - Johnny & Lynn Urrutia and Scott & Lori Jackson deed the
subject property to Sundance Arena LLC.

11/30104

Deed of Trust - between Sundance Arena LLC and Gary & Donna Hibbard
regarding the subject property

11121107

Judgment and Decree of Divorce entered between Johnny and Lynn Urrutia.

12/04/07

Deed of Trust - between Johnny Urrutia personally, no mention of Sundance
Arena LLC, and Lynn Urrutia purportedly on the subject arena property.

12/01111

Claim of Lien - Harrison and Schutte on the arena property for the time period
April 2005 through October 2011.

02114112

Complaint - Lynn Urrutia files against Johnny Urrutia, Rob Schutte and Ty
Harrison.

02/29112

Listing Resume from Land Title and Escrow, Inc -listing only the Quitclaim
Deed #2002-019528 filed 09/23/02 in which the Urrutias and Jacksons deed the
arena property to Sundance Arena LLC; and the Deed of Trust #2004-025612
between Sundance Arena LLC and the Hibbards filed 11130104.

05/16112

Notice of Claim of Labor and Materialmen's Lien - Harrison and Schutte's
second or amended lien on the arena property for the time period March 2008 and
"ongoing".

08/21112

Plaintiff files Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

2

0911212012

Plaintiff files for Preliminary Injunction

09/19/2012

Notice of Trustee's Sale of Sundance Arena LLC by Hibbard

10115112

Hearing - Plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment - Plaintiff is
successful in getting Defendants Harrison and Schutte's Claim of Lien filed
12/01111 dismissed, completely ignoring the secondlamended Notice of Claim of

Labor or Materialmen's Lien filed 05116112.
02/07/2013

Trustee's Sale of Sundance Arena LLC

02/15/2013

Preliminary Injunction Quashed

ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Whether the district court erred in failing to determine whether Lynn Urrutia had
standing to bring a claim to foreclose the deed of trust.

2. Whether the district court erred in determining that Lynn Urrutia was the prevailing
party.

3. Whether the district court erred determining that the gravamen of the claim was a
commercial transaction and awarding Lynn Urrutia attorney fees under Idaho Code
section 12-120.

4. \\1hether the district court erred in determining that Defendants defended and pursued
their claim frivolously, unreasonably and vvithout foundation, awarding Lynn Urrutia
attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121.

ARGUMENT

I.

Plaintiff's claim that Ms. Urrutia had standing to bring her claim fails because
she did not have a redressable injury related to the claim.
Plaintiff argues, relying on Bowles v. Pro Indiviso, Inc., 132 Idaho 371, 375, 973 P.2d

142, 146 (1999), that the issue of standing is about whether the party has a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy. (Resp. Brief, p. 13.) Here, Plaintiff contends, a party named as a
3

beneficiary in a Deed of Trust has a personal stake "in determining whether that lien is valid and
enforceable." (Resp. Brief, p. 14.)

Plaintiff s argument fails because Ms. Urrutia brought the wrong claim and her injury
cannot be redressed. "To satisfY the case or controversy requirement of standing, a litigant must
'allege or demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood the relief requested will
prevent or redress the claimed injury." Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P .3d
1157, 1159 (2001). Because Mr. and Ms. Urrutia did not have title to the property when they
encumbered it with the deed of trust, Ms. Urrutia cannot foreclose and thus, her injury,
nonpayment of the divorce settlement, cannot be redressed by this foreclosure action. (R. Vol. I,
pp. 31, 33 - 38, 40.) Instead, Ms. Urrutia should have brought an action to enforce the divorce
decree in magistrate court with the proper parties involved.

II.

PlaintifPs claim that Ms. Urrutia was the prevailing party fails because here
there are multiple claims and Ms. Urrutia gained no benefit from the litigation.
Plaintiff argues that the lower court properly found that Ms. Urrutia was the prevailing

party because she obtained partial summary judgment to invalidate the mechanics' lien and
succeeded in having the Defendants' counterclaims dismissed with prejudice. (Resp. Brief, p.
16.) However, Plaintiffs arguments fail because Ms. Urrutia did not succeed in her claim to
foreclose the deed of trust or gain any benefit from the litigation.
The trial court in reference to the prevailing party argument stated: "But she's ended up
with no relief in this case as to this particular part of the property because she got foreclosed."
(Tr. Feb. 26,2013, Barksdale, p. 72,11. 2-4.)
Plaintiff first contends that because the mechanics' lien and counterclaims were
dismissed, Ms. Urrutia is the prevailing party, relying on Daisy Manufacturing Co. v. Paintball

Sports, Inc., 134 Idaho 259, 999 P.2d 914 (et. App. 2000). However, not only is Daisy
4

Manufacturing distinguishable, it supports a fmding that Ms. Urrutia is not the prevailing party
and therefore Plaintiff's argument fails. There, the court found three factors under Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(d)(1 )(B) that must be considering when determining which party prevailed:
"(1) the final judgment or result obtained in relation to the relief sought; (2) whether there were
multiple claims or issues between the parties; and (3) the extent to which each of the parties
prevailed on each of the claims or issues." Id. at 262,999 P.2d at 917. In that case, the result
obtained was a dismissal with prejudice and the court found that it was "the most favorable
outcome that could possibly be achieved as a consequence of the litigation." Jd.
Here, the Plaintiff, Ms. Urrutia, brought a claim to foreclose a deed of trust. The relief
sought was payment of the promissory note secured by the deed of trust. (R. Vol. I, pp. 14 - 49.)
Ms. Urrutia obtained neither because her entire claim was dismissed. (R. Vol. I, pp. 189 - 191.)
However, because her foreclosure claim was dismissed and Defendants successfully retrieved
their property, she did not gain any benefit from the litigation with the Defendants. Furthermore,

Daisy is distinguishable because it was a single claim case, whereas here there were multiple
claims between the parties. Therefore, Ms. Urrutia cannot be the prevailing party. Because the
lower court did not consider this, it acted outside the bounds of its discretion.
Plaintiff also relies on Sanders v. Lanliford, 134 Idaho 322, 1 P.3d 823 (Ct. App. 2000).
This case is distinguishable because it also involved a single claim case. There, the court found
that dismissal of a claim in a single claim case, even without a trial, constitutes prevailing in the
action.ld. at 326, 1 P.3d at 827. Because it was a single claim case, the lower court's finding that

dismissal did not constitute prevailing was outside the bounds of its discretion because it was
inconsistent with applicable legal standards. Jd. Here, there were multiple claims between the
parties and it must be evaluated in terms of the whole action, including the dismissal ofMr.
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Urrutia's claim. (R. Vol. I, pp. 14 - 49; R. Vol. I, pp. 50 - 61, 107 -122.) The prevailing party is
not automatic, as a matter of law.
Plaintiff next argues that the lower court did not consider improper factors in determining
the prevailing party. Rather, the court's statements were dicta and that "such contextual musing
clearly were not the basis of the lower court's decision." (Resp. Brief, p. 17.) Plaintiff's
argument fails because dicta is a discussion that is not the basis of the court's decision. Here, the
court stated,
But for Hibbard's foreclosure, she would have obtained ajudgment foreclosing
defendant's first lien claim in its entirety. She completely prevailed on her defense of the
counterclaim as defendants obtained no relief against her. Had this case progressed to
trial, she would have clearly prevailed on defendants' second lien claim because it is
undisputed that the priority of her deed of trust predated the second lien. Applying these
principles oflaw, the Court determines that Lynn is the 'primary' prevailing party in this
case within the meaning ofI.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B).
(R. Aug., p. 835.) Because the lower court listed the prospect of prevailing at trial and but for the
Hibbard's foreclosure as part of the basis for fmding that Ms. Urrutia was the prevailing party,
this was not merely dicta. The court acted inconsistently with applicable legal principles and
therefore outside the bounds of its discretion.
Finally, Plaintiff asserts that ifthe court finds that Defendants are the prevailing party, the
court would be sanctioning the tort of abuse of process because they claimed personal property
in the Mechanic's Lien. (Resp. Brief, p. 18.). They argue that "[t]o attempt to obtain possession
of personal property by means of claim to foreclose a mechanics lien process; i.e. is a
commission of the tort 'abuse of process.'" (Resp. Brief, p. 18.) Plaintiff's arguments, however,
fail because moveable, portable chattel can qualifY as furnished materials under Idaho Code
section 45-501. BMC West Corp. v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 890, 896, 174 P.3d 399, 405 (2007). The
Defendants, in filing a claim of lien were trying to ensure payment for the work, improvements,
and materials they furnished. If they could not receive payment, they were entitled to regain
6

possession of the materials furnished and non-fixtures, which they were successful at when Ms.
Urrutia's claim was dismissed. Therefore, Plaintiff's abuse of process argument fails.

III.

Plaintiff's claim that the gravamen of the claim was a commercial transaction
entitling Ms. Urrutia to attorney fees fails because there was no commercial
transaction between Defendants and Ms. Urrutia.
Plaintiff argues that Defendants plainly alleged a commercial transaction underlying the

mechanics' lien and the unjust emichment counterclaim. Relying on Garner v. Pavey, 151 Idaho
462,469,259 P.3d 608, 615 (2011), Plaintiff argues that a commercial transaction does not need
to actually be proven if the claims allege an underlying commercial transaction. (Resp. Brief, pp.
20 - 21.)
Plaintiff's argument fails because Garner v. Pavey is distinguishable from this case. In

Garner, the claim involved the use of an easement over commercial property. Because of the
commercial easement claim, the parties had a contractual agreement between them. The claim
itself alleged a contract between the two parties, the Garners and the Poveys. Id. Here, the case
does not allege a contractual agreement between Defendants and Ms. Urrutia. Although the
mechanics' lien is a commercial agreement, it did not involve a transaction with Ms. Urrutia.
Thus, this case is more similar to BECD Canst. Co., Inc. v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., 145 Idaho
719, 726, 184 P.3d 844,851 (2008). BECD held that where there was no transaction between the
two parties, there was no commercial transactions which would entitle a party to attorney fees
under the statute. Because there was no transaction between Ms. Urrutia and Harrison and
Schutte and the claim does not allege a commercial transaction between them, there is no basis
for fees under Idaho Code section 12-120(3).
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Plaintiff's argument also fails because unjust enrichment is not a contractual claim by
definition. Barry v. Pacific West Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 834, 103 P.3d 440, 447 (2004).
Unjust enrichment is a theory used when there was no contract between the parties. Id. Here,
Defendants claimed unjust enrichment as an alternative to recovering on the mechanics' lien
because they made improvements for Johnny Urrutia, but in the foreclosure Ms. Urrutia was to
receive the benefit of those uncompensated improvements. Therefore, because there was no
contract or transaction between them, Defendants claimed unjust enrichment.
Finally, Plaintiff's argument fails because the center of the lawsuit was Ms. Urrutia
foreclosing a deed of trust granted to her as settlement for her divorce from Johnny Urrutia.
Thus, she was seeking to enforce a divorce decree. (R. VoL I, p. 31.) A divorce decree is not a
commercial transaction under the definition in the statute; rather it is a civil contract between
spouses.

IV.

Plaintiff's contention that Defendants brought and pursued their claim
frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation under Idaho Code 12-121
fails because Defendants' claims had a basis in law.
Plaintiff argues that Defendants' conduct was frivolous in pursuing the 2011 mechanic's

lien because Harrison and Schutte admitted they only made minor improvements during the 90
days prior to filing. (Resp. Brief, p. 22.) Plaintiff's argument fails because the Defendants
claimed in their definition that the work was continuous and had not been substantially
completed, providing a factual basis to pursue the claim of lien. (R. Aug., p. 197, 11. 7
211,11. 11

10, p.

25, p. 212,11. 1 5; R. Aug., pp. 143 - 145.) A mechanic's claim oflien must be

filed within 90 days after completion oflabar or services, or furnishing material. I.e. § 45-507.
This means that the claim of lien must be filed within 90 days of the date the work contracted for
is substantially completed. Because they had not substantially completed the work and the
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Defendants continued to assert that they were making improvements, pursuing the claim of lien
was not frivolous.
Plaintiff next argues that the district court correctly determined that pursuing the amount
of the mechanic's lien was frivolous because Defendants argued that the amount could be
adjusted at trial and that defending the lien was not warranted by law. (Resp. Brief, p. 23). This
argument fails because claiming an incorrect amount does not invalidate a lien. Electrical
Wholesale Supply Co., Inc. v. Nielson, 136 Idaho at 825, 41 P.3d at 253. The district court has

the discretion to award a lesser amount, even if the discrepancy is substantial. Id. Thus, because
Defendants' pursuit ofthe mechanic's lien had a basis in law that the amount could be adjusted
at trial, they did not pursue the claim frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.
Plaintiff further contends that there is no evidence that the second mechanic's lien
covered the same work and that because the date is clearly after the Trust Deed priority date, thus
pursuing the lien was frivolous. (Resp. Brief, p. 25.) This argument fails because a claimant can
file a subsequent lien claiming work in a previous invalid lien. Terra- West, Inc. v. Idaho .Uutual
Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho 393, 400, 247 P.3d 620,627 (2010). "A mechanic's lien, 'if any exists at

all, relates back to the date of commencement of the work or improvement or the commencement
to furnish the material.'" Id (quoting White v. Constitution Mining & Mill Co., 56 Idaho 403,
420,55 P.2d 152, 160 (1936». There, the work was completed under a continuous employment
contract, thus the lien "attached at the time the work began and encompassed all work
subsequently done under the contract." Id As long as the lien substantially complies with the
statute and is timely filed, the lien may encompass all labor or services performed under one
contract. Id. Here, the both claims of lien specify the same property, Sundance Arena, and claim
continuous work, and a similar value to the improvement. (R. Vol. I, pp. 59
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61, 74 -78.) The

legislature saw fit to protect unsophisticated workmen by allowing them to only have to
substantially comply as Harrison and Schutte did in this case. Thus, both liens claimed the same
work and the second lien, although the date is different, relates back to the date of
commencement of the work. Defendants' pursuit of the second mechanics' lien had a basis in
law and was therefore not frivolous.
Plaintiff next argues that the unjust enrichment claim was frivolous because the
improvements conferred would not affect the amount of Ms. Urrutia's lien. (Resp. Brief, p. 25.)
"Unjust enrichment occurs where a defendant receives a benefit which would be inequitable to
retain without compensating the plaintiff to the extent that retention is unjust." Vanderford Co.,
Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 557, 165 P.3d 261,271 (2007), the Defendants asserted the

counterclaim for unjust enrichment as an alternative argument in the event that Lynn Urrutia was
successful in foreclosing the deed of trust and the mechanic's lien was unsuccessful.(R. VoL I,
pp.60

78.) Ms. Urrutia would have received the benefit of the greatly improved property

without compensating the defendants. She claimed an interest in the property through the deed of
trust. A deed of trust that did not mention Sundance Arena LLC, the true owner, and which was
not mentioned in the listing resume or in the foreclosure action by the Hibbards (R. Vol. 1, pp.
00209-00223.) Therefore, Defendants were not frivolous in pursuing the counterclaim.
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants' contradictory position is frivolous. (Resp. Brief, pp. 26
- 27.) This argument fails because the Defendants were arguing in the alternative. If the
mechanic's lien was unsuccessful, Defendants wanted to be free to remove the property and
additional materials furnished that had not been paid for. (R. Vol. III, pp. 28 - 30, 104 - 106.)
Additionally, Plaintiff argued contradictory positions. Plaintiff claimed that there were not any
improvements made to the property, but also filed for an preliminary injunction, with a $1.00
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bond, to prevent Defendants from removing their materials or deconstructing any improvements
(R. Vol. III, pp. 11-27.)
"If there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact or a legitimate issue of law, attorney fees

may not be awarded under this statute even though the losing party has asserted factual or legal
claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Thomas v. Madsen, 142 Idaho
635,639, 132 P.3d 392,396 (2006). Defendants pursued their claims with a basis in law and in
fact, thus Ms. Urrutia is not entitled to fees under Idaho Code section 12-121.

V.

Plaintiff's argument that the award of fees under Idaho Code section 12-123 was
proper fails because Defendants argued in good faith and had a basis in law.
Plaintiff argues that because the judge determined that the conduct of Defendants was

frivolous, the award of attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-123 was proper if the lower
court's conclusions are upheld. (Resp. Brief, p. 27.) Plaintiffs argument fails because the
Defendants' arguments had a basis in law and argued for a good faith extension of the law.
Defendants pursued the mechanics lien because the testimony in the depositions claim
that the work and improvements were ongoing. (R. Aug., p. 197, 11. 7
212,11. 1

10, p. 211, 11. 11 - 25, p.

5; R. Aug., pp. 143 - 145.) The mechanic's lien was supported with facts that

substantially complied with the requirements of the statute. Franklin Bldg. Supply Co. v.

Sumpter, 139 Idaho 846,850,87 P. 3d 955, 959 (2003). Thus, the claim was suppOlied by fact as
required by Idaho Code section 12-123.
Second, Defendants' were not frivolous in opposing plaintiff's injunction and claiming
personal property also claimed in the mechanic's lien. Materials furnished can be properly
claimed in a mechanics' lien, Idaho Code section 45-501, and personal property can be the
subject of a mechanics' lien. BA1C West Corp. v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 890, 896, 174 P.3d 399,
11

405 (2007). The Defendants sought to remove their surplus personal property and also those
items in use in the arena but not attached so as to have become a fixture. This is clearly set out in
the Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Bond Amount for Preliminary Injunction and the
photographs attached thereto (R. Vol. III, pp. 535-573.) The Defendants should have been
allowed to remove the items stacked and those that could have been lifted out of use without
disturbing the ground or requiring any cutting or removal of bolts. The over broad preliminary
injunction gave the Defendants good reason to include unjust enrichment as an alternative cause
of action. The Defendants were in peril of losing not just the work and materials they put into the
arena but also their surplus materials. "Forfeitures are abhorrent to the law, and all intendments
are against them. Heisel v. Cunningham, 94 Idaho 461, 491 P.2d 178 (1971). [***14] Where the
forfeiture provision in a contract would provide an unjust and unconscionable recovery, it will
not be enforced and the recovery will be assessed according to the amount of actual damage.
Blinzler v. Andrews, 94 Idaho 215, 485 P.2d 957 (1971), appeal after remand, 95 Idaho 769, 519
P.2d 438 (1973)." Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co., 119 Idaho 946, 951 (Idaho 1991).
Finally, Defendants' counterclaim alleging unjust enrichment has a basis in law and in
fact and was not frivolous. Ms. Urrutia, if successful in her foreclosure claim would have
received a greatly improved property without compensating Defendants. Vanderford Co., Inc. v.

Knudson, 144 Idaho 547,557, 165 P.3d 261,271 (2007).

VI.

Plaintifrs argument that the Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 sanctions were
proper because the judge properly found that Defendants were frivolous fails
because Plaintiff and the lower court are considering the wrong standard.
Plaintiff argues that the standard for Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11 sanctions mirrors

the definition of frivolous conduct under Idaho Code section 12-121 and Rule 54(e) and
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therefore Mr. Rockstahl' s conduct in signing documents and bringing Defendants' claims is
frivolous. (Resp. Brief, p. 28).
Plaintiff's argument fails because they cite no authority for the assertion that the standard
for Rule 11 sanctions is the same as the standard for Idaho Code section 12-121 and, in fact, they
are not the same standard.
Although the rules use similar language, they are distinguishable. Rule 11 states,
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that the attorney or party has
read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge,
information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose ...
In contrast, Rule 54(e)(1) provides the standard for an award of fees under Idaho Code section
12-121. It provides that fees may be awarded only when the court finds "that the case was
brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation." LR.C.P.
54(e)(1). Both require that there be a basis for the claims, but Rule 11 "stresses the need for some
prefiling inquiry into both the facts and the law to satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by the
rule." Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 95, 803 P.2d 993,
1001. Further, "[t]he court is expected to avoid using the wisdom of hindsight and should test the
signer's conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to believe at the time the pleading, motion, or
other paper was submitted." Id. Thus, the standard is not the same because 12-121 does not focus
on a reasonable inquiry.
Because the district court did not apply the correct standard and consider whether
Defendants made a proper investigation upon reasonable inquiry, the district court abused its
discretion. It failed to act within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the
legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it.

13

VII.

Attorney fees

Plaintiff is not entitled to attorney fees on appeal because under Idaho Code section 12-121,
the prevailing party is only entitled to recover attorney fees if the appeal was brought frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation. Taylor v. AlA Services Corp., 151 Idaho 552, 574,261 P.3d
829,851 (2011). Further, "[w]here a case involves a novel legal question, attorney fees should
not be granted under I.e. § 12-121." ld. Here, Defendants did not bring this appeal frivolously,
unreasonably or \vithout foundation and argued novel legal questions, therefore, Plaintiff is not
entitled to attorney fees on appeal.

Schutte and Harrison claim attorney's fees and costs on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code
section 12-121. These attorney's fees and costs are proper in this case for the reasons stated in
this brief. See I.A.R. 35(b)(5), 40 and 41

CONCLUSION
The Defendants respectfully request that this Court reverse the judgment awarding
attorney fees and costs to Lynn Urrutia.

~

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this:l;1 day of November, 2013.

ROCKST AHL LA W OFFICE, Chtd.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on O$d day of November, 2013, I served a true and correct
copy of the following-described document upon the person(s) listed below in the manner noted:

Attorney for Lynn Urrutia

Harry DeHaan
Daniel Plantz
Law Office of Harry DeHaan
335 Blue Lakes Blvd. North
Twin Falls, Idaho 83301

MFirst Class Mail

I J Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

Joe Rockstahl
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